

SOVEREIGNISM AND NATIONAL POPULISM. COMPARATIVE REMARKS ON THE STATE CONCEPT IN EUROPEAN NATIONALISM (XX-XXI CENTURY)

GIUSEPPE FOGLIO*

Abstract: the paper aims to analyze the genesis and development of populist European regimes, starting with the differentiation between «sovereignism» and «national populism». Focused on the post-communist authoritarian parties in Central and Eastern Europe, this distinction can also be traced back to the twentieth century. Always, nationalism has developed a political strategy in two stages: 1) the seizure of power, which implies the dismantling of the rule of law («sovereignism»); 2) the difficult elaboration of a new social and political order («national populism»), which ranges from plebiscitary democracy to fascism. Of course, in such a process, what matters the most is to define the enemy (both internal: the universalism – of which the Jews are the highest expression; and external: the dominant superpowers from time to time such as Europe, America, or Russia).

Keywords: populism – sovereignism – nationalism – dictatorship – democracy – State

1. At first sight, the recent election results in Poland¹ seem to let the Western chancelleries and the democratic public opinion breathe a sigh of relief. On closer inspection, however, along with those in Slovakia and Argentina², they confirm that populism has become a permanent feature not just in the political landscape of developing countries, but also on a global scale³. As demonstrated by the outcomes of the recent Russian and European elections, and, predictably, those of the upcoming American

* Giuseppe Foglio, Ph.D. Student in Medical Humanities and Welfare Policies, University of Foggia. Email: giuseppe.foglio@unifg.it

¹ As it is well known, pro-European right party led by Donald Tusk won the parliamentary elections on 15 October 2023, but the national-populist far right confirmed its status as the leading party in the Polish political system.

² Symmetrically, at the elections of 30 September 2023, there was the affirmation of the populist left forces led by Robert Fico, but the progressive and pro-Western forces obtained comforting results. In Argentina, however, in a challenge between populists, the anarcho-capitalist Milei defeated the Peronist Massa in the runoff of the presidential election of 19 November 2023.

³ F. Finchelstein, 2010, 2014, 2017; C. de la Torre (ed.), 2015; A. Arato, 2016; M. Snajider, L. Roniger, C. Forment (Eds.), 2013.

elections⁴, populism has gone far beyond the time limits of transitory protest movements and requires a broader examination both from the conceptual and historical point of view. Triggered by the 2008's economic crisis and by its consequent austerity policies, populism withstood the repercussions of the pandemic, which seemed to usher in a cycle of neo-Keynesian policies - namely, antiliberal and antipopulist at the same time; and nowadays this is further adapting to the new scenario of political instability that war opened up. The latter should be given more thought. After all, the current confrontation between the West and the new powers can even be seen as the global clash between liberalism and populism. The identity nature of populism, however, can lead to unpredictable outcomes regarding in international political alliances. For example, the concern about war may have pushed Polish to shift support to pro-European parties, held more accountable for the risks of military escalation in the region, or simply more reliable in relations with the EU.

In any case, we cannot say that populism is on the wane. Indeed, after many years of electoral presence and, often, long experiences of government, it is possible to draw a populism history in the 21st century. In the last thirty years, in Europe, from being local and minority movements, often fighting each other⁵, the populist parties turned into dominant forces in coalitional, or even in one-party, governments. Therefore, it is by expanding its reach to the national and global levels, and by aiming to an independent political culture opposed to the liberalism, that populism has become national populism.

In spite of appearances, the populism's rise to power does not necessarily mean that, sooner or later, it will come to terms with democratic constitutionalism. Instead, once in power it seems to bolster its authoritarian and subversive features. While in the rising phase, populism has largely used fascist propaganda topics, including discriminatory and racist violence, to shift the balance of power from the centrist parties to the right ones, when it seizes power, the populism must be compared to the twentieth-century nationalism.

2. After the painful failures during the Restoration Age, in the second half of nineteenth century, national liberalism managed to find a reconciliation between the two times of the revolution - the seizure of power and the establishment of the new regime – because it accepted a compromise with the ancient Régime sovereigns, creating national and parliamentary monarchies. Born to oppose both socialism and liberalism, on the

⁴ While the Russian presidential elections were held from 15 to 17 march 2024, those for the European Parliament happened from 8 to 9 June 2024. However, what is more surprising is the head-to-head between the Rassemblement National (former Front National) and the Nouveau Front Populaire which has taken place at the French elections of 30 June and 7 July 2024. US presidential elections will be held on 5 November 2024.

⁵ I am referring to the breakup of the twentieth-century political parties throughout Europe at the end of cold war. That is how those localist, ethnic, or neo-fascist and neo-communist movements were born, which helped to reshape, often violently, the national political systems and even the territories of European States. See S. Bottoni, 2021; L. Dell'Aguzzo, 2020; J. Rupnik, 2019.

contrary, twentieth-century neo-nationalism aimed to overcome the modern state as its ultimate goal. But, doing so, it ran into the revolutionary transition's dilemmas, which already concerned socialism.

According to the renowned doctrine of revolutionary transition, the seizure of power has to be followed firstly: by the demise of the rule of law - not by its establishment, as in the nineteenth century; and secondly: by the creation of a new social order. In short, genuine nationalist institutions are needed to avoid losing consensus and finally power itself. But the problem is how to convert the plebiscite consensus - or its dramatic lack, as happened in the avant-garde Leninist movements - into regimes, that are long-lasting. To make a historical comparison with the post-1989 context, one could say that first the populism presents itself as «sovereignism», but, once in power, it takes the shape of «national populism⁶». In addition, the geographical aspects should be considered: as a modern political current populism shows global, or even transnational, features⁷. Finally, this article suggests a deepening of the comparative approach by highlighting the state concept, as a crucial issue for understanding the difference between «ideal populism» and «real populism».

On the one hand, in considering the countless cases of populism, one of the most important risks is to reduce it to an irrational reaction, both against successes and failures of modernity. On the other hand, it is almost impossible to reach an all-encompassing definition of populism. That is why the comparative approach to populism could be helping in overcoming this impasse⁸. The first time the scientific study of populism faced the problem of its very definition was in 1967 at the conference «To Define Populism». It was then that Isaiah Berlin used the happy metaphor of the «Cinderella complex» to outline the epistemological and methodological statute of the studies about populism⁹. Like the fairy tale's lost slipper, for Berlin, the term populism is always looking for its fitty foot but is likely to never find it. Of course, the metaphor means that it is almost impossible to identify an ideal Platonic model of populism, as a basis to assess every real historical case.

⁶ D. Stasi, 2018, 2020, 2022, 2023. See also O. Mazzoleni, C. Biancalana, A. Pilotti, L. Bernhard, G. Yerly, L. Lauener, 2023; R. Eatwell, M.J. Goodwin, 2018; G. Germani, 1978; P. Serra, 2018. For a comprehensive discussion on the link between populism and the crisis of democracy in the last twenty years, refer to F.M. Di Scullo, 2022.

⁷ F. Finchelstein, 2017.

⁸ Finchelstein, ambitiously, tries to analyze even the transnational aspects of the global populism, such as of the fascism, F. Finchelstein, 2017. In addition to the aforementioned works by Finchelstein, de la Torre, and Arato (see footnote 3), on comparative issues relating to nationalism, populism, and the crisis of liberal democracy, see at least K. Weyland, 1999; M. Tarchi, 2020; M. Caiani, 2020; C. Mudde, C.R. Kaltwasser, 2013; G. Martinico, 2021. On the social risks associated both with successes and failures of modernity, obviously, the reference is to U. Beck, 1986, 2007.

⁹ The Conference was held from 19 to 21 May 1967 at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences, with the title: «To Define Populism». The proceedings were published in G. Ionescu, E. Gellner (Eds), 1969. A summary of the sessions can be read in I. Berlin, R. Hofstadter, D. MacRae, L. Schapiro, H. Seton-Watson, A. Touraine, F. Venturi, A. Walicki, P. Worsley, 1968.

3. For several reasons, Berlin's stance had huge impact on the advancement of studies in this field. First, it called to a review of the relations between theory and history of the populism. Indeed, if there is no ideal populism, there will not even be a hierarchy in historical cases. And, therefore, populism has to be studied by a not-essentialist approach, and no longer Eurocentric. In this context it is important to mention Manuela Caiani's proposal to overcome «Cinderella complex» thanks to an empirical methodology, much more adequate because of several comparative studies:

«Recent comparative research suggested studying populism as a «gradual» property rather than a sort of «essence» or «core» of certain parties [...]. According to those studies, we do not look at populism as a dichotomous property, owned or not, by a political actor once and for all, but as a matter of «degrees», which can vary in time and space, even for the same subject [...]. For example, an actor might be «more populist» at the beginning of his career, and much less once he joins the ruling establishment (according to the inclusion-moderation thesis of populist parties from the margins in power)»¹⁰.

From this point of view, five definitions of populism¹¹ could enable to measure the phenomenon with no theoretical conjectures, which end up affecting the research. Such a change in perspective can also be useful to analyze the differences between left-wing and right-wing populisms, now better known as inclusive and exclusive populisms. In this field, obviously, the normative and ethnocentric approaches are prevailing, so that in Europe, where right-wing populism dominates, critical readings are many more than in South America, where left-wing populism is widespread. By choosing this empirical approach, thereby, it would be easier to identify suitable analysis and classification criteria, based, for example, on the following dimensions: material, political and symbolic. For Caiani, these dimensions refer to: «the distribution of resources between social groups; the call for political mobilization that goes beyond just electoral democratic representation; the boundaries of the notion of the "people" that is adopted¹²». Doing so, we become capable of converting abstract features into operating indicators that can be obtained from both statistical and, especially, qualitative sources, so overcoming another important barrier in the measurement of the phenomenon.

Contrary to Caiani, Marco Tarchi recommends a comparative and value-free («wertfrei») approach to the study of populism, but advocating the theoretical perspective, not the empirical one¹³. In particular, Tarchi underlines that in the last twenty

¹⁰ M. Caiani, 2020, 155 (my translation). For a concrete application of populism as a «gradual» property, see M. Caiani, P. Graziano, 2016. For the «inclusion-moderation thesis», see S. Tepe, 2019.

¹¹ Summarizing positions of different authors, Caiani identifies five definitions of populism: 1) rhetoric; 2) ideological; 3) organizational; 4) stylistic; 5) relational, depending on whether populism is identified with one of the listed aspects, which nonetheless characterizes the phenomenon in variable measure and, often, mixed with the other aspects. In addition, these definitions can be reduced to three if the first, the fourth and the fifth ones are grouped together. See M. Caiani, 2020, 151-155.

¹² M. Caiani, 2020, 159.

¹³ M. Tarchi, 2020.

years populism has reached a huge increase in attention and now, what is needed to escape the Berlin's prophecy, is to identify strict criteria for selecting both comparative data and comparative studies. Thereby, he identifies four of them: 1) the reference to the established tradition of studies on the general features of the phenomenon; 2) the connection between theoretical reflection and empirical analysis; 3) the endorsement for an interdisciplinary perspective; 4) the acceptance of a cumulative view of knowledge, that considers the wisdom of the sector classics. Based on that, Tarchi selects five works, among which the reference model, of course, is *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*¹⁴, if only for the number of contributions and for the structure integrating the conceptual approach with those empirical and descriptive. In the conceptual section, the authors, Cas Mudde, Kurt Weyland and Pierre Ostiguy, each according to one of the three definitions of populism – ideological, organizational, stylistic – try to give an answer to Berlin's prophecy. Just as meaningful is the attempt made by «Le Dictionnaire des populismes». In that work, however, the variety of viewpoints appears even overwhelming. So much that it ends up confirming the most known outcome in the literature, namely the identification of the three populism's distinctive standards: 1) the people as a unity; 2) the corrupt elite, who is taking the people sovereignty over; 3) the charismatic leader, who will restore direct link to the people¹⁵. Despite populism is an imperceptible object, Tarchi believes that, by multiplying points of view, research ends up fueling a fundamental removal: the acknowledgement that populism is an «ideology like the others». According to the author, although it is protean, a minimal objectivity cannot be denied to populism concept. Namely, if we consider that in the traditional conceptual lexicon, there are no other terms to define real political phenomena such as those ranging from Peronism to today's populist regimes, and, having several affinities, these phenomena require to be grouped under one name.

4. In the light of the above, it is clear why the historian Federico Finchelstein is confident that the comparative method can overcome the antithesis between empirical particularism and conceptual universalism. First of all, with the fascist era as an important watershed, he states the history of populism begins with the French Revolution and goes hand-in-hand with the anti-Enlightenment movements until today. Thus, he describes nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century populism, as prepopulism. Instead, populism, arose in 1945 only after the collapse of international fascism, has had Peronism as its classical expression and has established an authoritarian democracy rather than a

¹⁴ The works are C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo, P. Ostiguy (edited by), 2017; M. Anselmi, 2017; O. Dard, C. Boutin, F. Rouvillois (sous la direction de) 2019; J.W. Müller, 2017; D. Palano, 2017. In addition, among the general texts, see at least C. de la Torre, 2017; R. Eatwell, M. Goodwin, 2018; F. Finchelstein, 2017; R. Heinisch, O. Mazzoleni (edited by) 2016; G. Ivaldi, 2019; H. Kriesi, T.S. Pappas. (edited by), 2015; B. Moffitt, 2016; C. Mudde (edited by), 2016; C. Mudde, C. Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; M. Tarchi (a cura di), 2019; S. van Kessel, 2015; P. Serra, 2018; L. Zanatta, 2020.

¹⁵ M. Tarchi, 2020; M. Caiani, 2020, 152-153; F. Finchelstein, 2017.

totalitarian dictatorship. Therefore, populism must be distinguished from fascism because of its rejection of political violence¹⁶ and, above all, its origin outside Europe. Nonetheless, for Finchelstein, the relations between populism and fascism are specific, so much that we can say that «while not all forms of right-wing prepopulism turned into fascism, all fascisms had prepopulist roots¹⁷». To explain this historical and geographical comparison, Finchelstein proposes the following synthesis:

«1) Classical populism. Argentine Peronism was at the forefront, but this term also encompasses the second stage of Varguismo in Brazil (1951-54), Gaitanismo in Colombia (late 1940s), and the José María Velasco Ibarra era in Ecuador (1930s to the 1970s), as well as post-war populist experiences in countries like Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia.

2) Neoliberal populism. Carlos Menem in Argentina (1989-99), Fernando Collor de Melo in Brazil (1990-92), Abdala Bucaram in Ecuador (1996-97), Alberto Fujimori in Peru (1990-2000) and Silvio Berlusconi in Italy (1994-95, 2001-2006, 2008-11).

3) Neo-classical populism of the left. The Kirchner administrations in Argentina (2003-15), Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and Nicolás Maduro (2013-) in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador (2007-17) and Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006-), as well as the leftist neoclassical populist parties in Europe, such as Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece.

4) Neo-classical populism of the right and extreme right. From the Peronist neofascism of the 1970s, to the predominance of current right-wing movements and leaders, that are generally in the European opposition but can also be in power in countries like the United States, the Philippines and Guatemala, as well as in power coalitions like those in Austria, Italy, and Finland. These forms of neoclassical populism also include the regimes of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Opposition forms of neoclassical populism of the right and extreme right include UKIP in England, the National Front in France, Golden Dawn in Greece and the movements led by the xenophobe Pauline Hanson in Australia and Avigdor Lieberman in Israel, among many others»¹⁸.

This picture reveals that Finchelstein's book first of all responds to the rise of the «neo-classical populism of the right and extreme right», which has led to a complete change in global populist trends. Historically, «neo-classical populism of the right and extreme right» reverses the trend of post-war populism to distance itself from totalitarian violence. Geographically too, populism shows a sort of return flow from developing, or post-socialist countries, to the advanced countries such as the United States and Europe. That is why, to the question if and to what extent populism in the 21st century can reactivate a truly neo-fascist dynamics, Finchelstein answers that populism must be distinguished from fascism, but it remains closely connected with it. As the fascism, populism is a nationalist political movement, that both challenges and embraces modernity. Hence, it should not be confused with a transient phenomenon, nor idealized, mistaking it for some form of political nativism. Instead of declining after the relevant political transformations due to the pandemic and the war, the «neo-classical populism of

¹⁶ About political violence as discriminating between fascism and populism, see F. Finchelstein, 2017, 73-81.

¹⁷ *Ivi*, 109.

¹⁸ F. Finchelstein, 2017, 101-102.

the right and extreme right» definitely has defeated liberal populism and, far from confirming the inclusion-moderation thesis, it seems looking for a different model of state from the liberal-democratic one developed in the second half of the twentieth century¹⁹.

In order to identify a set of features shared among contemporary populisms, which could be useful to the comparative studies, Finchelstein offers the following list:

- «1) An attachment to an authoritarian, electoral, antiliberal democracy that practically rejects dictatorship.
- 2) An extreme form of political religion.
- 3) An apocalyptic vision of politics, that presents electoral successes, and the transformations those transitory electoral victories enable, as revolutionary moments in the foundation or refoundation of society.
- 4) A political theology founded by a messianic and charismatic leader of the people.
- 5) A consideration of political antagonists as the antipeople – namely, as enemies of the people and traitors to the nation.
- 6) A weak understanding of the rule of law and the separation of powers.
- 7) A radical nationalism.
- 8) A notion of the leader as the personification of the people.
- 9) An identification of movement and leaders with the people as a whole;
- 10) The claim of antipolitics, which in practice means transcending politics as usual;
- 11) The act of speaking in the name of the people and against the ruling elites;
- 12) A self-presentation of its standing for true democracy and against imagined or real forms of dictatorship and tyranny (the European Union, the parallel or deep state, empire, cosmopolitanism, globalization, military coups etc.);
- 13) The homogeneizing idea of the people as a single entity that, when populism becomes a regime, is then equated with its electoral majorities;
- 14) A deep antagonism, and even an aversion, to independent journalism;
- 15) A dislike for pluralism and political tolerance;
- 16) A stress on popular culture and even, in many cases, on the world entertainment as embodiments of national traditions»²⁰.

While, on the one hand, this detailed list shows the transnational scale and the relative coherence between the ideological, political, organizational, and cultural features of global populism, on the other hand, it warns against categorizing temptations, leaving open the question of whether or not there is a minimum definition of populism. In any case, the essence of populism is related to two political components: 1) the contestation of the established order; 2) the definition, however syncretic, of the new populist order. Still, no matter how dubious in theory, populism cannot do without the definition of its nature in practice. From this point of view, populism brings out the differences between conservatism and fascism. As the latter did, it employs the emotions and the imagination in its political struggle against rational forces, among which the modern state is the main

¹⁹ For a definition of a national and social democratic state as the highest point of the world's political development after the Second World War, see É. Balibar, I. Wallerstein, 1988.

²⁰ F. Finchelstein, 2017, 103-104.

representative. Envisioned as a united and mythical community, the people are deemed acting as the subject of the history, and their represented image crosses not only propaganda, but also party and institutional patterns. However, after gaining the power, this imaginary strength starts vanishing, because of the weakening or the missing of the enemies. From this point forward, populism is looking for different social institutions from those based on the hated separation between state and civil society; but they hardly can be found out, because the state in itself is deemed hindering their development. As it is known, in doing so fascism led to the totalitarian violence: first inside, where the new fascist man had to be forged; then outside, where the world war of extermination against inferior races had to be unleashed²¹. Therefore, beyond the waving relations between populism and fascism, in both cases something like an essence emerged directly from historical evolution. That is to say the essence of populism lies in the search for its essence. And it is not by chance that Ernesto Laclau set the symbolic dimension at the core of his theory of populism and defended its complexity against any criticisms of those who saw in it just an ideological endorsement of Peronism and Kirchnerismo.

«The construction of a popular subjectivity is only possible on the basis of discursively producing tendentially empty signifiers. The so-called «poverty» of the populist symbols is the condition of their political efficacy – as their function is to bring to equivalential homogeneity a highly heterogeneous reality, they can only do so on the basis of reducing to a minimum their particularistic content. At the limit, this process reaches a point where the homogeneizing function is carried out by a pure name: the name of the leader»²².

²¹ For the anti-state strength of totalitarianism, of course, reference is to H. Arendt, 1951.

²² E. Laclau, 2005, 40. Rather than judging the author's political choices, the main issue concerns populism itself. Paradoxically, it is the notion of populism that can be considered as an «empty signifier» more than that the leader/father. According to Laclau, the notion of «empty signifiers» goes hand-in-hand with that of «floating signifiers», namely «empty signifiers» which can be used in the political struggle by opposite parties at the same time. This is the case of the war of liberation in Italy (1943-1945), when the Risorgimento tradition and Garibaldi's iconic name were used by both the fascists and anti-fascists. That shows how much the people's identity itself, not only that of leader, could be up for grabs. Moreover, Laclau claims that his definition of populism is purely theoretical and formal, and, insofar as the people's identity is necessarily antagonistic, gets it to the point of asserting that populism and politics are synonymous. In that way, the modern rationalist myth of a political subjectivity perfectly coinciding with the community to be represented – as declined by Rousseau in the opposition between «volonté de tous» and «general will»; by Saint-Simon in the theory of shift from the «governance of persons» to the «administration of things»; and by Marx in his famous theory of revolutionary transition from the «dictatorship of the proletariat» to the «classless society» - would imply the exact negation not only of politics but also of every chance that something like «the people» could manifest itself. Of course, this symbolic logic of populism is as fascinating as risky. It can be easily argued that identifying the populism with the political could immediately turn into the identifying the populism with the anti-politics. In many contexts, the function of symbolic general equivalent performed by «empty signifiers» and «floating signifiers», rather than polarizing society in the general political opposition between the people and the elite, has helped to make political struggles as much generic as undecided, and has ended up to depoliticize the policy itself through the mythologization of the enemy, of the leader and of the redeemed people. See also E. Laclau, 2011, 2014, 2018. About the metaphorical - and polarizing? - feature of traditional political theology, see E. H. Kantorowicz, 1989; A. Boureau, 1989, 2018.

5. In Europe, this feature of the «neo-classical populism of the right and extreme right» has become prominent. In his studies on populism in Central and Eastern Europe, Daniele Stasi stressed that a nineteenth and twentieth-century nationalism renewal is under way. In particular, he makes a distinction between «sovereignism» and «national populism».

«The definition of «national populism» is to be preferred to that of «sovereignism». An authentic «sovereignism» should claim for the nation state, in addition to the «ius ad bellum» – which every nation has renounced to join the UN –, the exit from the European institutions, NATO, the EU, even from the Visegrád Group, to fully restore the national sovereignty, accompanied by the withdrawal of the set of international rules governing relations between people in general. None of the national populists, in Poland as in Hungary, in Slovakia as in the Czech Republic, claims to want to return to a «full», or modern, sovereignty, if anything, their aim is to strengthen their positions in the European institutions and large political families. This, for example, is the case of Viktor Orbán, who, despite the EU's warnings about his government action, claims for himself and his party «Fidesz», a not marginal role in the majority party in the Strasbourg Parliament, the European People's Party to which it belongs»²³.

Focusing on the transition from «neoliberal populism» to «neo-classical populism of the right and extreme right», Daniele Stasi points out that in Central and Eastern Europe countries the 1989's liberal enthusiasm has almost completely vanished. Although they had followed a reforms plan which reached partial successes in the economic integration with Western Europe, these countries paid a very high social cost due to the effects of privatizations and the entry of the transnational capital in the economy and in the public debt financing. Since the 2008 crisis, of course, criticism of free trade has paved the way not only for protectionist but also for anti-euro policies. However, it could be misleading to define all of that as «sovereignism». As it has been said, Eastern European populist governments do not aim to withdraw from international bodies and supranational institutions, such as the EU, but to transform them from inside in a populist sense. Because of that, the commitment to understand what to mean by national populism is more relevant than ever. To be sure, national populism intends to provide an alternative to Western liberal democracy, in terms of authoritarian democracy. But, refusing the reading of the 1989 as revolution from above, national populism claims to refer freedom to the people, rather than the individuals²⁴. And in doing so, populism is driven to intertwine liberal individualism and democratic egalitarianism. So, it follows that the direct democracy may coexist with a one-man-leadership, and the private property with the denial of human rights.

Coming to the relationship between national populism and fascism, today in Europe, apart from the presence of openly neo-fascist groups within populist coalitions, the

²³ D. Stasi, 2020 (my translation).

²⁴ J. Rupnik, 2019.

reference to fascism is generally presented in two forms: 1) the rehabilitation of fascism as a political regime; 2) more insidiously, the continuous search for the external enemies - every representative of liberal universalism – and the internal enemies – as it is showed in the resurgence of anti-Semitism and, in general, in the demonization of diversity in all its forms: sexual, cultural, ideological, ethnic, religious.

In order to understand the genealogies of contemporary European populism, Daniele Stasi reminds us of its roots in the nationalism fin de siècle and, above all, in the interwar era. Especially in Poland – even if a similar discourse could be made for Hungary –, two myths have come together: to be a fallen power and to be the geopolitical center between East and West. In the twentieth century, this is what fueled the spread of two Polish nationalist currents: the socialist and federalist one, headed by Józef Piłsudski and the populist, ethnic and anti-Semitic one, led by Roman Dmowski²⁵.

Pursuant to the Wilson's Fourteen Points²⁶, officially the Piłsudski's Great Poland was presented at the end of World War I, and its reference pattern was the Polish-Lithuanian Union (1569-1795) – the so-called First Polish Republic. Since Poland is located in the middle between East and West, and has a multinational population, only a federal state could have guaranteed its political independence, democratic government and social inclusion. In addition, such a constitution would have allowed Poland to withstand the pressure of its bulky and meddling neighbors²⁷. In this sight, therefore, it is the state that gives a shape to the nation.

On the contrary, Dmowski tried to find a foundation of Poland within a presumed national hard core, which gives identity to the people. According to him, the true Polish are not the city dwellers, and the bourgeoisie in general, but the catholic villagers, even racist and antisemitic. Such a nationalism pattern claims to locate a substantive identity of the people and to grow it through the exclusion of the not-Polish. The negative effects of this path are all too well known: based on the idea of a small Poland, this genuine national populist ideology needs to always create new enemies to fuel its policy. As a result, at the opposite of the Piłsudski's Great Poland, it is the nation that gives a shape to the state.

Despite enormous differences, these two nationalisms share some characteristics. First, they support the shift from romantic nationalism – which was unable to mobilize the masses to achieve the independence – to revolutionary nationalism. Second, both regard Poland as the political power in the middle of the West and the East, better between Slavic, German, and Islamic powers. Today, when the redefinition of borders in Eastern

²⁵ D. Stasi, 2018, 2022;

²⁶ See Ed. Encyclopedia Britannica, 2023: «13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant».

²⁷ L. Dell'Aguzzo, 2020, 72-74.

Europe awakens dreams of power and old grudges, the latter feature is increasingly relevant.

Third and most important, by taking an imagined community as a real one, both invent their own tradition and claim that it is the only true Polish identity. As it happens with any imagined community, pre-national, or rather non-national Poland is represented as the origin of the modern nationality. Unfortunately, the lonely real thing is not nation, but nationalism itself. In addition, since the swap between imagined and historical community is something mimetic and not rational, it can become authoritarian and violent²⁸.

6. Nationalism's modern, imagined and potentially violent character has a significant impact on the concept of state. Despite populism is bound to the particular historical contexts in which it is spreading, there are two issues which arise on a regular basis: 1) how to seize power; 2) what regime to establish, which could be properly populist. As in interwar era, after the 2008 crisis populism has focused first on its revolutionary features, which include the tactic to seize power by legal means. In that moment, populism showed its own antiliberal and antiparliamentary shape, and supported a plebiscitary democracy, based on the homogeneity of the people, led by a charismatic and empathetic leader²⁹.

²⁸ Of course, the reference is to B. Anderson, 2006. As it is well known, this book represents one of the most original contributions to the renewal of the debate on nationalism at the end of the Cold War. At that time, national identities and conflicts reappeared on the scene suddenly, as soon as the contrast between the rationalist and universalist ideologies of liberalism and socialism came to an end. By defining the nation as «imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign» (B. Anderson, 2006, 6), Anderson can assert that: 1) the nationalism is a real historical fact, unlike the nation, which was born from the imagination of a very ancient and non-existent past; 2) the nationalism is more a product of modernity, than a return of the archaic. More clearly expressed in B. Anderson, 1992, the last point is the most relevant to understand the disturbing feature that the nationalism shares with the fundamentalism. In addition to works by H. Seton-Watson, 1977, and T. Nairn, 1977, Anderson inserts his work in the wide debate on the issue which took place during the eighties and nineties. At least, see E. Gellner, 1991; E.J. Hobsbawm, 1990; and E.J. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger (edited by), 1983. On the relationship between mimetic desire and violence, see the mimetic theory in R. Girard, 1972.

²⁹ On the history of democracy as a political regime opposed to liberalism, the classic book is C. Schmitt, 1928. Of course, the Rousseau's democratic theory is there deeply modified. Explicitly opposing to the republican and socialist tradition which claims for the consular government or the collective dictatorship, Schmitt tries to harmonize direct democracy with the dictatorship of one person. In addition, based on the first edition of «Der Begriff des Politischen (1927)» (C. Schmitt, 1994b), the identity of the people founding the new State depends on the definition of the enemy of the nation. In 1932 a booklet edition of the text was published (C. Schmitt, 1963), which also included the conference on «Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen (1929)» (C. Schmitt, 1994c). Although the legitimacy of the dictatorship is confirmed, Schmitt's preferred government regime is the presidential one with extensive executive powers. However, at source of Schmitt's research on antiliberal democracy, the main work still remains C. Schmitt, 1921. As a development of the famous distinction between commissary dictatorship and sovereign dictatorship, Schmitt drafted his doctrine of sovereignty as a decision on the state of exception in C. Schmitt, 1922. In many writings, Schmitt acknowledged the Spanish diplomat Donoso Cortés as the inspirator of his doctrine. Sharp interpreter of the sunset of the Restoration, according to Schmitt, Cortés saw in the dictatorship the only chance to stand against the liberal and democratic legitimacy not in merely conservative forms. See C. Schmitt, 1996. It is no coincidence that the legitimacy both of democracy and modernity is a crucial issue crossing the entire work of the controversial German author, from the

However, once in power, even the «neoclassical populism of the right and the extreme right» faced the issues of the transition from the liberal state to the populist one. Although it stopped at the threshold of dictatorship, the «neoclassical populism» implemented a strengthening of the executive at the expense of the judicial and legislative power and stood up in the face of EU protests against such violations of the rule of law. In return, by emphasizing elections as road to the revolution by legal means, right-wing neoclassical populism is forced to tolerate government alternation, like currently in Poland.

In order to avoid confusing the comparative approach with a theory of the populism «à la carte», the following topic's dimensions have to be focused. To be sure, the EU represents an external and constraining framework, which can inhibit the «sovereignism» of the extreme right; but it also seems at work an internal political and ideological feature, specific of the radical nationalism and the early fascism. Once the nationalism has gained power, the far-right wing pushes towards a «second revolution³⁰». While the revolutionaries have been useful to seize power, after the regime was established, they are deemed to undermine its stability. In the twentieth century, as is known, the extremists ended up prevailing and the dream to tame the fascism by constitutional means, or at most to reduce him to a Bonapartist regime, has vanished in front of totalitarian violence spiral. Today this totalitarian spiral is outdated, therefore the development of the national populist state strongly aims to replace liberal and democratic civil society with a community ethnically founded. And it is constantly searching for «konkreten Ordnungen» (concrete orders)³¹, that can give ethical content to the national

theory of political myth – taken from Georges Sorel – to the debate with Hans Blumenberg. See C. Schmitt, 1994a, later merged into C. Schmitt, 1923; and H. Blumenberg, 1966. Who has taken seriously Schmitt's thought about identity and democracy is Chantal Mouffe. She appreciates the way Schmitt criticizes representative democracy on the basis of friend-enemy opposition. Both her purpose is to use Schmitt's theory against Schmitt. That is to say thinking of an agonistic democracy which does not deny political struggle for the hegemony, but in a pluralistic context. In particular, Mouffe suggests to change «homogeneity» with «commonality» as the foundation of a political system which can overcome the paradox of representative democracy without fall in that of identity populism: «The problem we have to face becomes, then, how to imagine in a different way what Schmitt refers to as "homogeneity" but that – in order to stress the differences with his conception – I propose to call, rather, "commonality"; how to envisage a form of commonality strong enough to institute a "demos" but nevertheless compatible with certain forms of pluralism: religious, moral and cultural pluralism, as well as a pluralism of political parties». See C. Mouffe, 1999, 50; 2000, 2005, 2018.

³⁰ About both «revolution by legal means» and «second revolution» the reference is to the dialectic between moderate and revolutionary fascists at the beginning and the end of the history of fascism, as well as to the opposition, partly phantasmatic, between Hitler and supporters of Röhm and Strasser in Germany between 1930 and 1934. In the end, the supporters of the «revolution by legal means», like Hitler, defeated both moderates and revolutionaries. Literature is endless, see at least W. Shirer, 2011; and J. Fest, 1973.

³¹ C. Schmitt, 1934. While in the 1920s Schmitt's thought was dominated by the decisionistic concepts of dictatorship, identity democracy, sovereignty and state of exception, in the 1930s research and interventions around the concrete orders theory prevailed, inaugurated by the text on «Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens» (The Three Types of Legal Thought). See C. Schmitt, 1934. Starting from the essay by Jens Meierhenrich (J. Meierhenrich, 2016), a wide debate developed, often intersecting that on populism, about the Schmittian turn from decisionism to institutionalism. In this essay, the author

populist citizenship³². By doing so, finally the «neoclassical populism of the right and extreme right», cannot but to deal with the political theology, on which it has founded its success. The mystic relationship between the people and the charismatic leader, that inspired mass demonstrations and subdued the rule of law to the rule of the will, fails in making permanent the national mobilization, penalty the crisis of the regime. At that point, the attempts to normalize the exception by building a system of intermediate bodies leads to a reawakening of the extreme right which always appeals to the «second revolution». Finally, this lack of intermediate bodies forces populism to political instability. Paradoxically, as the neoliberalism, national populism produces regimes with a very heavy head and a frail body as well. Such a dialectical interplay between liberalism and populism, more and more evident within the extreme right-wing, and especially within the anarcho-capitalism, makes it crucial a fresh interpretation of democracy, of the state and of their mutual relationship.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANDERSON Benedict, 1992, «The New World Disorder». In *New Left Review*, 1, 193, 2-13.

ANDERSON Benedict, 2006, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London, New York (ed. or. *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Verso, London, 1983).

ANSEMI Manuel, 2017, *Populismo. Teorie e problemi*. Mondadori Education, Milano.

ARATO Andrew, 2002, «Dictatorship before and after Totalitarianism». In *Social Research*, 69, 2, 473-503.

ARATO Andrew, 2012, «Conceptual History of Dictatorship (and Its Rivals)». In *Critical Theory and Democracy. Civil Society, Dictatorship, and Constitutionalism in Andrew*

tried to argue that Schmitt has always been institutionalist and only briefly decisionist. Today, of course, the theoretical front is very wide and jagged. In addition to the turn's supporters, there are researchers that simply deny it ever happened, and others, which aim to admit the turn, but in a context of theoretical continuity. Of course, being the institutionalism strictly linked to the debate on the State crisis, a reading could be added that, in turn, connects the legal institutionalism with the Schmitt's stand for nationalism. Among the most attentive authors to the relationships between the theory of democracy, the history of populism and the evolution of Schmitt's thought, at least Andreas Kalyvas and Andrew Arato should be mentioned. See A. Kalyvas, 2000, 2001, 2007, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2018, 2019a 2019b; A. Arato, 2002, 2013.

³² According to Ernest Renan: «A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life». E. Renan, 1990, 19.

Arato's Democratic Theory, edited by Enrique Peruzzotti, Martin Plot, 208-281. Routledge, London.

ARATO Andrew, 2016, *Post Sovereign Constitution Making. Learning and Legitimacy*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

ARENDR Hannah, 1951, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Harcourt, Brace & World, New York.
BALIBAR Étienne, WALLERSTEIN Immanuel, 1988, *Race, nation, classe. Les identités ambiguës*, La Découverte, Paris.

BECK Ulrich, 1986 *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg eine andere Moderne*. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main; trad. it. Id., 2021, *La società del rischio. Verso una seconda modernità*. Carocci, Roma.

BECK Ulrich, 2007, *Weltrisikogesellschaft. Auf der Suchen ach der verlorenen Sicherheit*. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main; trad. it. Id., *Conditio humana. Il rischio nella società globale*. Mondadori, Milano.

BERLIN Isaiah, HOFSTADTER Richard, MACRAE Donald, SCHAPIRO Leonard, SETON-WATSON Hugh, TOURAINE Alain, VENTURI Franco, WALICKI Andrzej, WORSLEY Peter (1968). «To define populism». In *Government and Opposition*, vol. 3, n. 2, 137–179, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44481863>

BLUMENBERG Hans, 1966, *Die Legitimität der Neuzeit*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.

BOTTONI Stefano, 2021, *Un altro Novecento. L'Europa orientale dal 1919 a oggi*. Carocci, Roma.

BOUREAU Alain, 1989, «Introduzione». In Kantorowicz Ernst H., *I due corpi del Re. L'idea di regalità nella teologia politica medievale*. Einaudi, Torino, XIII-XXVIII.

BOUREAU Alain, 2018, *Kantorowitz. Histoires d'un historien*. Les Belles Lettres, Paris.

CAIANI Manuela, GRAZIANO Paolo 2016, «Varieties of Populism: Insights from the Italian Case». In *Italian Political Science Review*, vol. 46, n. 2, 243-267.

CAIANI Manuela, GRAZIANO Paolo, 2019, «Understanding Varieties of Populism in Times of Crisis». In *West European Politics*, vol. 42, 6, 1141-1158, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2019.1598062.

CAIANI Manuela, 2020, «Come misurare il populismo». In *Polis*, 34, 1, 151-164.

DARD Olivier, BOUTIN Christophe, ROUVILLOIS Frédéric (sous la direction de), 2019, *Le dictionnaire des populismes*. Les éditions du Cerf, Paris.

DE LA TORRE Carlos (edited by), 2015, *The Promise and Perils of Populism. Global Perspectives*. University Press of Kentucky, Lexington.

DE LA TORRE Carlos, 2017, *Populismos. Una inmersión rápida*. Tibidabo, Barcelona.

DELL'AGUZZO Loretta, 2020, *Conflitti separatisti. Caucaso meridionale, Europa orientale e Balcani (1991-2014)*. Carocci, Roma.

DI SCIULLO Franco M., 2022, *La democrazia della sfiducia. La rappresentanza nell'età del paradosso 2001-2020*. Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli.

EATWELL Roger, GOODWIN Matthew J., 2018, *National populism. The Revolt against Liberal Democracy*. Penguin, London.

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA THE EDITORS OF, 2023, *Fourteen Points. United States Declaration*. <https://www.britannica.com/event/Fourteen-Points>.

FEST Joachim, 1973, *Hitler. Eine Biographie*. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin.

FINCHELSTEIN Federico, 2010, *Transatlantic Fascism. Ideology, Violence and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945*. Duke University Press, Durham-London.

FINCHELSTEIN Federico, 2014, *The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War. Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina*. Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford.

FINCHELSTEIN Federico, 2017, *From Fascism to Populism in History*. University of California Press, Oakland.

GELLNER Ernest, 1991, *Nations and Nationalism. New Perspectives on the Past*. Wiley-Blackwell, Hoboken (N.J.).

GERMANI Gino, 1978, *Authoritarianism, fascism and national populism*. Transaction Books, New Brunswick N.J.

GIRARD René, 1972, *La violence et le sacré*. Grasset, Paris.

HEINISCH Reinhard, MAZZOLENI Oscar (edited by), 2016, *Understanding Populist Party Organisation. The Radical Right in Western Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan, London.

HOBBSAWM Eric J., RANGER Terence (edited by), 1983, *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

HOBBSAWM Eric J., 1990 *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

IONESCU Ghița, GELLNER Ernest (edited by), 1969, *Populism. Its Meaning and National Characteristics*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London; Macmillan, New York.

IVALDI Gilles, 2019, *De Le Pen à Trump. Le défi populiste*. Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles.

KALYVAS Andreas, 2000, «Carl Schmitt and the Three Moments of Democracy». In *Cardozo Law Review*, 21, 5-6.

KALYVAS Andreas, 2001, «Hegemonic Sovereignty: Carl Schmitt, Antonio Gramsci, and the Constituent Prince». In *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 5, 3.

KALYVAS Andreas, 2007, «The Tyranny of Dictatorship. When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman Dictator». In *Political Theory*, XXXV, 4.

KALYVAS Andreas, 2009, *Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary. Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt*. Cambridge University Press, New York.

KALYVAS Andreas, 2014, «Solonian Citizenship: Democracy, Conflict, Participation». In *Il Pensiero Politico. Rivista di Storia Delle Idee Politiche e Sociali*, 34.

KALYVAS Andreas, 2015, «The Sublime Dignity of the Dictator. Republicanism, Dictatorship, and Political Modernity». In *Annual of European and Global Studies*, 2.

KALYVAS Andreas, 2018, «Carl Schmitt's Postcolonial Imagination». In *Constellations*, 25, 1.

KALYVAS Andreas, 2019a, «Whose Crisis? Which Democracy? Notes on the Current Political Conjuncture». In *Constellations*, 26, 3.

KALYVAS Andreas, 2019b, «Democracy and the Poor: Prolegomena to a Radical Theory of Democracy». In *Constellations*, 26, 4.

KANTOROWICZ Ernst H., 1989, *I due corpi del Re. L'idea di regalità nella teologia politica medievale*. Einaudi, Torino (ed. or. *The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Medieval Political Theology*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957).

KRIESI Hanspeter, PAPPAS Takis S. (edited by), 2015, *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession*. Ecpr Press, Colchester.

LACLAU Ernesto, 2005, «Populism. What's in a Name?». In *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy*, edited by Francisco Panizza, 32-49. Verso Books, London-New York.

LACLAU Ernesto, 2011, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. Capitalism, Fascism, Populism*. Verso, London-New York.

LACLAU Ernesto, 2014, *The Rhetorical Foundations of Society*. Verso, London-New York.

LACLAU Ernesto, 2018, *On Populist Reason*. Verso, London-New York.

MARTINICO Giuseppe, 2021, *Filtering Populist Claims to Fight Populism. The Italian Case in a Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

MAZZOLENI Oscar, BIANCALANA Cecilia, PILOTTI Andrea, BERNHARD Laurent, YERLY Grégoire, LAUENER Lukas, 2023, *National Populism and Borders. The Politicisation of Cross-border Mobilisations in Europe*. Elgar, Cheltenham.

MEIERHENRICH Jens, 2016, «Fearing the Disorder of Things. The Development of Carl Schmitt's Institutional Theory, 1919-1942». In *The Oxford Handbook of Carl Schmitt*, edited by Jens Meierhenrich, Oliver Simons, 171-216. Oxford University Press, New York.

MOFFITT Benjamin, 2016, *The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, DOI: 10.1515/9780804799331

MOUFFE Chantal (edited by), 1999, *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*. Verso, London, New York.

MOUFFE Chantal, 2000, *The Democratic Paradox*. Verso, London-New York.

MOUFFE Chantal, 2005, *On the Political*. Routledge, London-New York.

MOUFFE Chantal, 2018, *For a Left Populism*. Verso, London-New York.

MUDDE Cas, ROVIRA KALTWASSER Cristobal, 2013, «Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism. Comparing the Contemporary Europe and Latin America». In *Government & Opposition*, vol. 48, 2, 147-174.

MUDDE Cas, ROVIRA KALTWASSER Cristóbal, 2017, *Populism. A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

MUDDE Cas (edited by), 2017, *The Populist Radical Right. A Reader*. Routledge, Abingdon.

MÜLLER Jan-Werner, 2017, *What Is Populism?*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, DOI: 10.9783/9780812293784

NAIRN Tom, 1977, *The Break-up of Britain. Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*. New Left Books, London.

PALANO Damiano, 2017, *Populismo*. Editrice Bibliografica, Milano.

RENAN Ernest, 1990, «What is a Nation?». In *Nation and Narration*, edited by Khomi Bhabha, 8-22. Routledge, London, New York (ed. or. *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? (1882)*, Kessinger Publishing, Whitefish MO, 2010).

ROVIRA KALTWASSER Cristóbal, TAGGART Paul, OCHOA ESPEJO Paulina, OSTIGUY Pierre (edited by), 2017, *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

RUPNIK Jacques, 2019, *Senza il muro. Le due Europe dopo il crollo del comunismo*. Donzelli, Roma.

SCHMITT Carl, 1921, *Die Diktatur. Von der Anfängen des modernen Souveränitätsgedankens bis zum proletarischen Klassenkampf*. Dunker & Humblot, München-Leipzig.

SCHMITT Carl, 1922, *Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*. Dunker & Humblot, München-Leipzig.

SCHMITT Carl, 1923, *Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus*. Dunker & Humblot, München-Leipzig.

SCHMITT Carl, 1928, *Verfassungslehre*. Dunker & Humblot, München-Leipzig.

SCHMITT Carl, 1934, *Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens*. Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg.

SCHMITT Carl, 1963, *Der Begriff des Politischen. Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien*. Dunker & Humblot, Berlin.

SCHMITT Carl, 1994a, «Die Politische Theorie des Mythos (1923)». In Id., *Positionen und Begriffe. Im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923-1939*, Dunker & Humblot, Berlin, 11-21 (ed. or. *Positionen und Begriffe. Im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923-1939*, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg, 1940).

SCHMITT Carl, 1994b, «Der Begriff des Politischen (1927)». In Id., *Positionen und Begriffe. Im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923-1939*, Dunker & Humblot, Berlin, 75-83 (ed. or. *Positionen und Begriffe. Im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923-1939*, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg, 1940).

SCHMITT Carl, 1994c, «Das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen (1929)». In Id., *Positionen und Begriffe. Im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923-1939*, Dunker & Humblot, Berlin, 138-150 (ed. or. *Positionen und Begriffe. Im Kampf mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles, 1923-1939*, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg, 1940).

SCHMITT Carl, 1996, *Donoso Cortés. Interpretato in una prospettiva paneuropea*. Adelphi, Milano.

SERRA Pasquale, 2018, *Populismo progressivo*. Castelvecchi, Roma.

SETON-WATSON Hugh, 1977, *Nations and States. An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.

SHIRER William, 2011, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A History of Nazi Germany*. Simon & Schuster, New York.

SNAJIDER Mario, RONIGER Luis, FORMENT Carlos A. (edited by), 2013, *Shifting Frontiers of Citizenship*. Brill, Boston.

STASI Daniele, 2018, *Le origini del nazionalismo in Polonia*. Angeli, Milano.

STASI Daniele, 2020, «L'Est e il nazional-populismo». In *Patria indipendente*, in <https://www.patriaindipendente.it/longform/est-e-il-nazional-populismo/>, 14/10/2020.

STASI Daniele, 2022, «*Polonia restituta*». *Nazionalismo e riconquista della sovranità polacca*. Il Mulino, Bologna.

STASI Daniele, 2023, «Elezioni in Polonia, un Paese spaccato fra paure e speranze». In *Micromega*, in: <https://micromegaedizioni.net/2023/10/20/elezioni-in-polonia-un-paese-spaccato-fra-paure-e-speranze/> , 20/10/2023.

TARCHI Marco (a cura di), 2019, *Anatomia del populismo*. Diana, Napoli.

TARCHI Marco, 2020, «Lo studio del populismo fra complessi e rimozioni». In *Quaderni di sociologia*, XLIV, 83, 131-140; online dal 01 aprile 2021, in: <http://journals.openedition.org/qds/4109>; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/qds.4109>

TEPE Sultan, 2019, «The Inclusion-Moderation Thesis: An Overview». In *Oxford Research Encyclopedia*, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.788>

VAN KESSEL Stijn, 2015, *Populist Parties in Europe. Agents of Discontent?*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, DOI : 10.1057/9781137414113.

WEYLAND Kurt, 1999, «Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe». In *Comparative Politics*, 31, 4, 379-401.

ZANATTA Loris, 2020, *Il populismo gesuita*. Laterza, Roma-Bari.